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The recent evolution of development thinking  vidual development operations find their ulti-
has highlighted popular involvement in decision-  mate justification in a sector and country.
making. Yet policy gridlock and stop-and-go  Strategic alliances among development agencies
implementation have been associated with  - global and local, governmental and nongov-
"excessive" responsiveness to interest groups.  ernmental - have to be strengthened to facilitate
dissemination and to achieve results on a larger
The paper argues that the success with  scale. Visible results in improved living stan-
participatory development projects remains  dards, expanded economic opportunity for the
spotty:  world's poor, and a protected environment will
be the acid test of global participation.
*Communication  between  development
policy professionals anc grassroots practitioners  Four main recommendations for develop-
leaves much to be desired.  ment policy flow from Picciotto's review of
- The discourse of development economics  participatory development:
remains dominated by macroeconomists, while
institutional economics remains at the margin of  First, participation should be viewed as a
development research.  vital complement to macroeconomic adjustment.
o  The very concept of participation has not
been subject to rigorous scrutiny, and a more  Second, institutional development is en-
systematic approach to participation appears  hanced by policy reform and should be pursued
desirable.  in its own right as part of a country's develop-
ment strategy. Achieving an adequate legal
The focus on participatory development  framework, civil service reform, and public
signifies an opening of development economics  information dissemination should have priority
to disciplines other than macroeconomics. In  - as these elements help reduce societal trans-
particular, microeconomics and business admin-  action costs and risks.
istration must join forces under the umbrella of
institutional economics, political economy  Third, the institutional aspects of develop-
should be rediscovered by development econo-  ment projects and programs should be given
mists, and development practice should be  appropriate weight. In this context, priority
shaped by all the social science disciplines.  should be given to the full use of market mecha-
nisms to concentrate scarce participation skills
To accelerate this process, Picciotto puts  and resources where they have the greatest
forward a transaction-based definition of partici-  impact - on the creation and maintenance of
pation and proposes a cost-benefit approach to  public goods.
the design of participation processes. He links
participation to institutional development and  Fourth, special emphasis should be placed on
suggests that the spread of constructive change  the efficient production and dissemination of
from pilot to project to programs will not take  knowledge, as well as on telecommunications
place without the design of realistic wholesaling  and transportation infrastructure, since these
programs combined with policy and institutional  investments also facilitate efficient social and
reform at the macro level. Only then will indi-  economic interaction.
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is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretationls, mid
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent of ficial Bank policy.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This working paper has  its origins in  an  absorbing and tumultuous workshop on
participatory development  sponsored by the World Bank and the Swedish International Development
Association on February 26-27, 1992, in Washington  D.C.  Tne event brought together development
scholars  and  practitioners, non-governmental organization leaders  and  multilateral  development
banks' staff, economists and non-economists.
Much  common  ground  was  found  ?--  a  consensus  emerged  on  practical
recommendations  to enhance popular participation  in project design and financing.  Still, it is fair to
say  that,  by  the  end  of  the  session, many appealing hypotheses were  left  dangling  and  the
intellectual tension which  had  flared between economists and  other  development professionals
remained palpable.
This paper seeks no policy or  academic breakthrough.  Its aim is to  pull together
seemingly disparate strands of development thinking and experience.  After debunking some popular
myths  (Box  1), the  development antecedents of  participation are  identified (Section 2)  and  a
definition of participation is offered (Section 3).  Next, a stylized theory is presented at the mircro
level (Section 4).  Some implications are then drawn for organizational  design (Section 5) and for
development  policy planning (Section 6).
While the paradoxes associated with participatory development will continue to fuel
controversy,  the concept appears to have potential as a unifying framework for development inquiry.
To  be  sure,  more examples are  needed to  beef  up  the theory and  more  theory is  needed to
illuminate an elusive development reality.  In the spirit of participation,  the reader is invited to help
tie up the loose ends and to fill the gaps.2
Box 1:  Five Prevalent Myths about Participation
Just as fertile soils attract pests, new policy insights generate myths.  And just  as hardy
weeds blend in with the crops they infest, myths tend to be long lived if they contain a germ of truth.
Accordingly,  the metwohor  of participatory development  has spawned  a  number of superficially plausible
myths.
"Participation  is an end in itself"
Irrespective of the end result, participation  generates a  sense of well being among group
members.  When the group fails to achieve its goal, it is natural for its leader to glorify the process
rather  than  bemoan  its  disappointing outcome.  However, emphasis  on  the  intrinsic  value  of
participation  often dampens the appetite for results.  When all is said and done, participation  should be
judged in termns  of its contribution  to substantive  goals.
"The more participation,  th  better"
Since  special  efforts  are  needed  to  motivate employees  towards  an  organizational
objective, it is natural for managers to emphasize the rewards to be secured through more participation.
Conversely,  members intent on influencing  group activities are inclined to push for ever higher levels of
participation.  Yet, in  the real world, organizations conscrain the behavior of group members within
appropriate norms; group leaders ration their time; and scarce organizational  resources are judiciously
shared between participation  and other processes.  One can have too much of a good thing.
"The larger the group, the better"
This myth is convenient to leaders who measure their success in terms of organizational
growth.  This  is  a  common predilection since  leaders tend  to  derive financial benefits and  social
influence by  ruling over large groups.  However, bureaucratization  and  collective action  constraints
come  into play  as  the group expands.  The  larger the organization, the  greater the  difficulties in
maintaining  cohesion, flexibility and economy in resource use.  To maintain efficiency, countervailing
restraints must be applied by other stakeholders;  e.g. owners in a private enterprise; budget authorities
for a public agency; etc.
*  "Participation  makes control redundant"
This myth is widely prevalent since the individuals subject to control constitute the vast
majority of  group members.  However, control is  not coercion.  In  any  organization, controls are
needed to validate progress, decide on mid-course  corrections  and deal with "free riders".  Participation
needs control just as control needs participation.  Only utopian anarchists still believe in the vanishing
of the State.
"Local decision making is invariably more participative"
Understanding of  local  values,  community backing  for  development  initiatives and
mobilization of  local  resources are  essential  ingredients of  participatory development.  However,
decentralization of  decision making  can  lead  to  pervasive control by  local  elites.  Strong central
authority is often needed to ensure fair allocation of resources  and protection  of disadvantaged  groups.3
2.  PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The direct  involvement of  individuals in  the  resource allocation decisions which
affect their lives has become a  central theme of development. Thus, the "broader participation of
all people in productive processes and a more equitable sharing of their benefits" is a major thrust
of the Development  Assistance Committee's Policy Statement on Development Cooperation in the
l990s.1/
This  conception of  development reflects promising policy  trends  in  developing
countries. The push towards broad-based  participation  is linked to the recent reorientation  of policy
towards poverty reduction; private sector development, human capital formation and environmental
protection.  Evaluation findings  confirm that  projects developed with  sensitivity to  social  and
cultural realities are  more  likely  to  deliver  productive results.  Beneficiary participation  and
community involvement have begun to permeate development  assistance programs.  The transition
to  democracy in Latin America, the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union, and the
political liberalization emerging in  Africa have induced greater popular participation on  a  global
scale.  So is the realization that the shortcomings  of deveiopment  in the 197Cs  and  1980s will only
be  overcome  through  strategies  which  embody  sustained  adjustment  and  sound  economic
management.
Thus, the advent of  participatory development will imply changes in  development
practice as  well  as  in  the  focus  of  development research, operational evaluation and  policy
dialogues.
Development  Theory
Participatory development also coincides with the emergence of human development
as  a  counterpoint to  traditional theories which purport to  describe vast  societal and  economic
changes through simplistic equations.  Stripped to  their essentials, neoclassical models rely on  a
production function which relates output to the amount of capital and labor employed.  Empirical
efforts to  validate these  models have  yielded discouraging results.  Typically, half  or  less  of
observed economic expansion can be explained  by labor and capital increments. In addition, capital
intensive  patterns  of  development have  done  little  to  achieve the  fundamental objective  of
development-poverty reduction.  The  new  growth economics 2/  incorporate human capital and
technological progress as  distinct  factors of  production.  They  recognize the  role  of  people,
knowledge and ideas in  the development process, thus inviting non  economists to  trespass into
development  economics.
Lessons of Experience
At  the  micro  level,  project evaluation studies have  unearthed high  failure rates,
where  beneficiary involvement is  lacking  and organizational capacities are  overestimated.  The
importance of appropriate policy environments in determining project outcomes is well established.
Project preparation, appraisal and  implementation  techniques are being retooled to  incorporate up-
to-date participatory  techniques.
Equally, country dialogues are being affected. The excesses of central planning and
State domination of productive sectors are now widely recognized. Conversely, triumphalism about
instant market solutions to  each and every development problem has become muted.  The precise
delineation of  laws  and  regulations, the  sequencing of  reform, its  scope  and  the  institutional
development  strategies which must follow policy adjustment  receive tailor-made solutions.  A wide4
range of  experimentation is  taking place  as  reforming countries seek  solutions adapted  to  their
diverse predicaments.
In  this  context,  participation forms  part  of  sound  economic management  if  it
enhances,  rather  than  restrains, flexibility  in  the  face  of  change.  Successful adjusters  have
displayed a capacity to leam and adapt in response to technological and market shifts; altered global
conditions or  strategic moves by  competitors.  In tum, this  has  led  them to  implement market
:riendly policies, a supportive  and flexible public sector and a judicious mix of debureaucratization,
decentralization  and deregulation.
Often, such reforms have required social sacrifices and/or have been disruptive to
vested interests.  Successful performners  have been those in a position to rely on the maintenance of
social cohesion in  the face of  severe shocks.  They have drawn on a  critical mass of  political
support to inaugurate adjustment  and they have used participation to secure a durable consensus for
reform;  and  to  sustain  desirable policy  directions through flexible  implementation strategies.3/
Conversely, representative  governments highly responsive to their electorates have found it difficult
to  adopt rigorous fiscal policies.  No  clear linkage has been found between democratization and
economic growth.  See World Development Report 1991, The Challenge of Development, Oxford
University Press, June 1991, pp. 132-136.
Governance
Participation is  a component of governance.  Irrespective of the political system in
place,  good  govemance  implies  economic  management  which  is  shaped  by  accountability,
transparency and the rule of law.  Despite wide dissemination  of "best policy practice" and a broad
consensus on the desirable ingredients of reform, policy reversals in developing countries have been
numerous and, in  the aggregate, development results have left much to  be  desired.  Thus, given
difficult global conditions, per capita incomes in  developing countries declined in  1990 as well as
in  1991, the  only  time this  has  happened since  1965 when the  World Bank  starteJ  collecting
comprehensive  data on developing countries.4/
Strategy is not implementation. The gap between making policy and getting things
done  must  be  closed.  Responsiveness is  not  easily  combined with  efficiency in  economies
characterized by  pervasive corruption, mistrust in  the legal  regime, civil strife, etc.  Hence, the
growing interest in  the institutional dimension of development-i.e.  governance.5/  Simply put,
governance goes beyond the policy itself and reflects a preoccupation with the constitution of policy
and its implementation.
Shifts in Sectoral  Priorities
Yet  another reason  policy makers are  struggling to  define  and  adopt  judicious
participation strategies into the management of  economies is  the growing importance of  sectors
which demand collective action (see Section 6, below).  A constructive engagement of  the State
combined with effective reliance on the market has become imperative to overcome the undersupply
of public goods whihh has become an increasingly  limiting constraint to economic  growth.
A  decade  or  more  of  restraint  in  public  expenditures  has  created  a  large
infrastructure  gap.6/  The  worldwide  information  economy  is  dependent  on  effective
telecommunications  networks which require significant investments.  The cyclical pattem of energy
prices  as  well  as  growing environrental  constraints on  the  development of  traditional  energy
sources are  likely to  trigger massive investment requirements before the end of  the decade.  In
order to  keep food production in  line  with needs (while arresting the degradation of the  natural5
environment),  large outlays for agrobiology research and improved soil, water and forest resources
management systems are called for.
In  all these areas, a  suitable balance between economic, social and environmental
objectives will have to  be struck; a  mix of public and private funding will have to  be raised and
mor..  Eflcient  management and service deliverv arrangements will have to  be  constructed.  New
relationships  between the State, the private sector, producers, consumers and the public at large will
have  to  be  forged.  The desigrn and  operation of  such  alliances will be  a  major  objective of
development  in the 1990s and beyond.
More Rigor  Needed
In  short, the recent evolution of development thinking has highlighted the role of
popular involvement in decision making.  Yet, policy gridlock and "stop and go"  implementation
has been associated with "excessive" responsiveness  to interest groups.  Successful experience with
participatoiy development projects remains spotty.  Communication between development policy
professionals and  "grassroots" practitioners leaves a  great deal to  be  desired.  The  discourse of
development economics remains  dominated by  macro-economists while institutional  economics
remains at the margin of development research.  The very concept of  participation has not been
subject to  rigorous scrutiny.  A more systematic approach to participation appears desirable.  This
working paper is designed to encourage additional research and evaluation work on the subject.
3.  PARTICIf ATION DEFINED
Some participatory development advocates equate participation with the  legendary
philosopher's stone-the  universal solution to mankind's problems; the key to prosperity and social
harmony; etc.  But  the concept also  encompasses more prosaic meanings.  To  participate is  to
partake, to share, to own.  In a club, it means enjoying social activities  7/  in. sport, exerting efforts
on behalf of the tearn.  In business, sharing in the risks and rewards of an enrterprise.
The term is elastic.  It describes either a process or a  means towards an objective.
As  a process, it denotes individual involvement in group activities.  As a  goal driven concept, on
the other hand, it encompasses the social interactions which characterize a  group as well as their
contribution  towards a desired end result.
In  this  paper,  participation  is the  sum of  the  human  transactions  which  take
place  voluntarily  (within and  across  organizations) in  a  society aiming  to achieve sustainable
and  equitable  economic growth.  This formulation  excludes coercive and violent interactions.  It
implies transparency in the process of participation  as well as accountability  for its outcomes.  The
definition is  broad  but  it  invites the  decomposition  of  participatory development into  its  major
components-from the micro (organization)  level to the society as a whole.
Participation takes  many  interrelated forms.  It  is  shaped  by  the  interests  of
participants, their relative status, their access to  resources and the  information available to  them
regarding the benefits and costs of future interactions.
The institutional framework defines the boundaries within which participation takes
place, the penalties involved in transgressing them and the benefits which may materialize . At its
most basic level, participation involves listening, validation of  informnation,  sharing of perceptions
and  opinions,  declarations  of  value  and  interest,  etc.  This  is  the  appreciation  phase  of6
participation.  Next, active consultation, persuasion, exploration of  options, coordination of  plans
and negotiations of collaborative arrangements may intervene.  This is the influence phase which
may  lead  (but  not  invariably so)  to  joint  decisions consecrating an  exchange  and/or  a  new
relationship among participants, govemed by informal protocols or  embodying specific rights and
obligations for the participants.  This is  the consummation  (or  contractual)  phase,  a  threshold
which must be crossed before the action or implementation phase of participation when the fruits
of  cooperation are  reaped  and  the  resiliency  -f  the  collaborative arrangements  are  tested.
Throughout the process, and especially during the action  phase, leaming takes place, lessons are
drawn and  adjustments are  made in  the relationships.  This  eventually leads to  the evaluation
aspect of participation, when feedback into future participation  cycles is provided.
At all stages, participation  involves implicit or explicit rules of conduct generated by
the participatory process itself or by the cultural context and it fulfills a  wide range of functions:
representation; influence; deliberation; mediation; negotiation; consultation; etc.  How  do  these
transactions affect societal efficiency?  How do they contribute to development?
For the neoclassical economist, institutions do  not matter.  But in  the real world,
they do:  economic development depends on more than population growth and the  savings rate.
Productivitv arises from specialization  and trade as well as from technological  progress and resource
allocation.  Economic theory sho-Ws  that division of labor combined with structured exchange allows
satisfaction of needs to be matched with efficient remuneration  of producers' efforts.  As products
and services become more differentiated  to meet increasingly  diverse consumer needs and tastes, the
production process requires increased cooperation among a  plurality of economic agents.  Further,
as new techniques of production and communication  emerge, specialization  induces additional trade.
And, in parallel with increasingly  complex economic systems, more intricate social structures must
come into existence.
In  short, economic growth requires a  vast  increase in  the  volume, diversity and
complexity of  transactions within and among organizations.8/  Participation within firms involves
cocperative relationships through design and observance of rights and obligations between owners,
managers, employees and  suppliers.  Efficient production and trade call for predictable forms of
interaction among  organizations as  well  as  protocols of  access to  information, resources  and
common facilities.  This in tum requires social arrangements which regulate behavior and facilitate
cooperative action in the public interest.
For sustainable development  to take place, the efficiency of these arrangements  must
improve as the volume of transactions expands.  This is where participation comes into play both
within and among firms.  Properly understood, participation is what distinguishes  development from
mere growth.
Definition of  transaction goals,  settlement of  terms ard  regulation of  ights  and
obligations take place according to prescribed role-expectations,  sanctions and norms.  The resulting
network of  relationships (i.e. the  role and the  status of  individual social agents) constitutes the
institutional framework of  participation.  Thus,  participation pervades all  aspects of  the political
economy and  of the  civil society.  Box 2  illustrates how political, legal and market institutions
influence and help to define participative  processes.7
Box 2:  Participation in the Society
Social interactions can  usualy  be  described in  economic, political or  legal  terms.  In
some cases (e.g. an  auction: a  polidcal conv nuon: a  tral)  the transactions  are  specialized and  best
analyzed from the perspective of a  single discipline (economics; politics; the law).  In  others (e.g. a
developmnent  scheme)  the tansaction  may have several facets or purposes which may ba- illum,  inated by
more  than  one  social science.  A  rough  typology is  displayed below, using the  tiangular  design
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It  is,  therefore, apparent that  public transactions (right hand  corner and  apex of
triangle) grow together with the private transactions which make up the market.  As the volume of
market transactions expands, complementary  non-market processes become imperative and Lhe  State
must intervene to  do things which the market cannot do  for itself.  Maintenance of competitive
conditions enhances freedom of exchange and expands consumer choice.  Regulatory action to deal
with externalities (e.g., polluting industries) requires government intervention.  So does the delivery
of public goods (e.g., infrastructure)  upon which efficient production activities depend.  Last but not
least, enforcement of  law  and  order  (the  apex of  the  triangle) prevents asocial coercion from
interfering with voluntary and orderly exchange.  The fundamental paradox of development lis  in
the fact that, as economic growth proceeds, markets become more efficient by virtue of their size
while non-market transactions (required to sustain the market) tend to become more complex and to
require new political coalitions, cultural shifts and  institutional reforms.  Hence, the fundamental
importance of cost effective participation.
4.  THE  ECONOMICS OF PARTICIPATION
It should be  clear, by now, why economic development involves a quantum change
in the volume of social and economic transactions. Since transacting takes place within and among
firms, we begin with a  simple model of  participation  within the firm.  We take  for granted that
communications  resources as well as participatory  skills are in short supply.
In  such circumstances, just  as  inadequate participation is undesirable, a  relentless
search for ever more participation can be counterproductive. What then is the appropriate level of
participation?  What are the constraints to  effective participation?  To  answer these questions the
costs of participation  must be weighed against its benefits.
Participation costs within the finn  are related to  three factors:  (i)  the number of
communication links among units in the  firrn; (ii) the frequency of  transactions carried by these
links; and (iii) the average intensity of the average transaction.
The number  of units  is a  function of  the degree of  autonomy needed within the
firm to handle its mandate.  The following formula relates the number of units N to the number  of
potential  communication links  among them:  L  = N(N - 1)/2, a  parabolic curve.  Hierarchical
structures, decision-making processes and  norms limit the number of channels actually used but,
other things being equal, information  flows and transactions rise with the number of units.
The average  number  of transactions  is  a. function of  the self  sufficiency of the
individual unit:  the  more specialized the  business, the  more transactions needed to  achieve a
desired outcome,  the greater the need for cooperation  and the higher the frequency of transactions.
Finally, the average  intensity  of  the  transaction  depends on  the efficiency achieved in  process
management within the firm, a function, among other things of the effectiveness  of controls and of
the degree of cultural cohesion and corporate loyalty.  The more effective the controls, the more
commitment to  group  goals,  the  more homogeneous the  organizational culture-the  lower  the
intensity and cost of the average transaction.9
Thus, the costs of participation are especially high in organizations which require a
great deal of custom made work and intemal autonomy.  Cost is also a  function of the complexity
of the organization's activities, and hence of tle  degree of specialization required within the firm;
(see Box 3).  The more diverse the owners, clients and products; the finer the role clefinition of
units  and employees; the greater the need for  involving owners, suppliers, middle managers and
employee representatives in policy formation;  and the heavier the transaction costs.  Finally, the
stronger the traditions arid culture of the organization, the greater the voluntary compliance of its
membership to organization norms, and the lower the intensity and costs of the average transaction.
With cohesion, discipline, and  organizational  harmony, the resources required for mediation and
consensus building are greatly reduced.
In  the  words of  Kenneth Arrow:  "Trust is  an  importamt  lubricant of  a  social
system.  It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other
peoples' word.  Unfortlnately, this is not a  commodity which can be  bought very easily ... Trust
and  similar  values,  loyalty  or  truth  telling,  are  examples of  what  the  economist would  call
'externalities' ..."  10/
The same structural and cultural factors come into play with respect to the benefits
of  participation but,  in  addition, process comes into sharp  focus.  Participation is  the  vehicle
through which representation  (and hence legitimacy) is achieved and support for organizational  goals
is  secured.  It  is  also an  information medium and a  way of  eliciting employee motivation and
consumer loyalty.  Finally, it  is  a  coordination mechanism which complements formal control
processes where these are cumbersome  or time consuming.
In Section 3, participation was defined as a voluntary process which takes place in
five stages-appreciation, influence, consummation, action and  evaluation.  Not all phases of this
cycle need to be experienced for participation to take place:  the benefits expected to accrue to one
or  more of  the participants may not  justify the  costs of  moving from  one  phase to  the  next.
Besides, the voluntary character of participation makes the possibility of "exit" a litmus test of  ie
credibility and  integrity of  the participatory process.  For  example, where power  relations  are
asymmetrical, the group leader may skip the appreciation and influence phases and resort to  the
threat of exit.  In such circumstances,  participation is mobilization  and its voluntary character may
be  questioned.  Yet,  the power of  the weak  is often underestimated.  Nor, under most social
circumstances, is exit likely to be entirely free of cost or penalty.l1/  Therefore, the appreciation
and  contractual phases are often occasions for the  participants to  specify the thresholds to  exit
which they  voluntarily undertake to  establish.  Typically, the  expected benefits associated with
participation rise from appreciation  to influence and to the consummation  of a contract.  From then
on, the difficulties of cooperation and the impact of exogenous constraints become evident and can
lead to diminishing and eventually declining expectations  of benefits.  Heavy upstream participation
is therefore an effective strategy only where it conformns  with realistic responses at the downstream
phase.  The management of expectations is a crucial test of leadership in any participatory process.
Therefore, the coordination, informational and motivational advantages derived from
participation are highly variable.  They depend on  the specific stage of  the participative process.
Where a  participative transaction contributes to  a  productive investment (e.g. through cooperative
involvement  of beneficiaries in project design and maintenance),  its returns can be ascribed in part
to the costs incurred in participation.  Similarly, the benefits of a  reform are related both  to the
design of  the policy measures and to  the resources used in securing support among stakeholders.
In  general,  participation is  needed to  secure a  judicious balance among  interests and,  hence,
commitment to  the success of  the initiative.  Typically, easy choices (benefitting all  parties) are
made first and yield handsome returns.  But as these "win-win"  options are exhausted, benefits are10
Box 3:  Costs  of  Participation
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more  and  more difficult to  achieve.  Indeed, diminishing retums eventually tum  into negative
returns (point M) as the centrifugal forces which are inherent in  autonomy, a  larger group and a
greater number of participating  units end up overwhelming the benefits of the participation process.
Hence, curve B in Graph 1 (Box 4).
The fundamental difference between market and non-market participation is that the
former permits autonomy and diversity through choice while the latter must,  by definition, seek
conformity without unanimity.  Beyond a certain point, the satisfaction  of divergent private interests
requires compromises  in policies or program design which can undermine the overall interest.  The
challenge of  participation is  to  secure sufficient harmony to generate and  sustain action without
sacrificing the  essentials of  the  initiative.  However, not  every  interest can  be  satisfied and
participation processes can quickly reach an  impasse where there is strong opposition to  change,
even from a  small minority.  This explains why organizations as well as  societies need decision
protocols and hierarchical structures which eventually come into play as the limits of cooperation
are  reached.  Conversely, the  strains to  cohesion and  stability which arise  when  controls are
repeatedly exercised (e.g., to silence vocal minorities)  suggest that ample use of the market and full
scope  for  cooperative behavior must  be  practiced at  the  outset to  achieve constructive change
without forsaking stability.  The unique task of  participative leadership is to  shift positions from
autonomy to cooperation,  to control as circumstances  evolve.
Size is not a neutral design factor.  The larger the organization, the higher the unit
costs  of  participation.  This  proposition rests  in  part on  psychological factors:  once a  group
exceeds 8-12 people, formal processes tend to be  needed and these are more costly.  Of course,
organizational design and  management skills  can  minimize the  disadvantages of  large  scale  by
"building in"  the  requisite mix  of  autonomy, cooperation and  control.  But  the dysfunctions of
collective action for large groups impose constraints which are not easily surmounted (Section 6).
Therein lie the diseconomies of scale commonly associated with bureaucracies.  Small scale favors
autonomy and,  hence,  client  responsiveness, as  well  as  market  flexibility-and  it  yields  lower
transaction costs.  The optimum scale for an organization is reached when the economies of scale
associated with the production process (dependent on the fixed costs of market entry and on the
requirements of  specialization) yield to  the increased costs associated with longer decision making
lines and higher internal transaction  costs.
Participation can  also  be  viewed from  the perspective of  a  production function
where output depends on  various factors, including labor and resources spent  in participation.12/
Imagine a simplified model involving a  firm that has a fixed amount of labor time to be allocated
between direct production activities and participation.  A  condition for maximization is  that  the
marginal product of  labor in  the two activities should be  equal.  If the productivity of labor in
direct production activities goes up, the time spent in participation  would, other things being equal,
go down, i.e., the efficiency of participation  would need to be enhanced to justify the maintenance
of  existing participation levels.  Of course, different kinds of production functions yield different
outcomes and the value of participation  is likely to be quite different depending on the shape of the
marginal cost curve for participation.  For example, in  a  routinized marketing process, relatively
small  amounts of  participadon may  be  optimal while  a  multi-disciplinary team  working on  a
development  project might need a lot of participation.
As  feedback in  cybemetics, excessive participation is  likely  to  yield  instability.
Equally, adjustment of the system to exogenous shocks depends on the activation of relatively small
but crucial compensating  zontrol mechanisms. The geometry of the structure is interlinked with the
engineering of participation  processes. To achieve equilibrium,  control intervenes.12
Box 4:  Participation Costs and  Benefits
The schedule of costs and benefits vary from organiation  to organizadon and depend on
the overall institutional environment.  But it is possible to elucidate its general shape by  speculating
about the underlying determinants of organizational transactions. On  the cost side (curve C in  Graph
1), a monolithic organization (homogeneous  ownership:  zero autonomy) requires no participation  outlays
at  alL  As autonomy increases (if only because of the growing size of  the organization), the cost of
participation rises.  It  does so rather steeply because the number of  transactions rises faster than the
number of units within the organization  given the need for lateral as well as vertical communication.
Risk  factors  are  important in  shaping social interactions.  One  of  the  benefits  of
participation  is to reduce uncatainty and risk.  Thus, market diversification  and ownership heterogeneity
can lead  to  significant participation costs  which may, however, be justified in  terrns of lower risks.
Hence, the important linkage with the control aspects of the organization.  Full voluntary participation
must be  secured if  no  controls exist and  no paricipation whatsoever is needed if  100% reliability is
achieved through formal controls.  Hence, for  a  given level of  autonomy, the relationship between
control and participation is displayed in Graph 2.
The optimumn  level of control (C) yields the level of participation (M) which produces the
greater excess  of  benefits  over costs.  Of  course, if  this  level  of  participation necessitates lower
achievements with  respect to  other  important institutional goals,  another  option may  be  selected.
However, by the time participation has reached level (N), it has exhausted its utility and begins to be
positively harmnful.
The graphs illustrate the plausible proposition that the  harrnonious fit  of structure and
process in an organization requires explicit choices and that, in considering them, the costs and benefits
of transactions  must be taken into accounL
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The  calibration of  controls in  response to  changes in  extemal  conditions is  a
management  function.  Leadership  consists  in  facilitating  organizational change  to  ensure
compatibility between the requirements of the component actors while achieving the objectives of
the organization.  Of course, where people are concemed, ethical concems are fundamental and
intervene through corporate, cultural and  religious norms-e.g.  the  reciprocity factor  found  to
underlie most formal and informal processes of participation.
There is no automatic congruence between the interests of each and every individual
in a  group.  Effective functioning of the group involves securing the participation of  a  sufficient
share of the membership and motivating them to achieve group objectives. This calls for incentives  I
and penalties and therefore the authority to  calibrate reward and punishment.  A successful group
does not necessarily meet in ftll  the needs of all participants.  But there are minimum needs which
must be met to avoid serious dysfunction  and ultimate disintegration.
5.  IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATION DESIGN
Because organization is a fundamental  determinant of economic and social outcomes,
analysis of  organizational aspects is  an  important, albeit neglected, aspect of  development.  In
principle, development program evaluation should include the design, selection and evaluation of
organizational  options in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness in achieving  project or program
objectives.
For most  organizations, responsiveness, efficiency and  sustainability, are  relevant
objectives.  To achieve them in  appropriate combination,  the organization  must deliver products or
services of adequate quality at reasonable cost, where and when needed.  In turn, this signifies an
appropriate mix of flexibility,  efficiency and reliability  in the conduct of organizational  functions.
Internally,  participation  motivates  employees  as  a  complement  to  financial
incentives and employment security.  Participative  management  is especially beneficial where quality
of output is prized.  And as suggested above, it is most needed in volatile market situations when
survival demands organizational  flexibility, and demands a substantial degree of intemal autonomy.
There is, on the other hand, a point beyond which participation  becomes excessive, e.g. in terms of
the  timelincss of  decision making-or  simply because the  same results can  be  achieved more
economically through financial  incentives or intemal controls.
Externally,  the  nature  of  participation hinges on  whether the  organization faces
competition or acts as a monopoly.  In the former case, the role of participation  is largely bome by
the market, at least insofar as  interaction with consumers is  concerned.  In  the latter case, the
design of explicit participation  processes is crucial to achieve consistent organizational  results.  This
is akin to  the role which Albert 0.  Hirschman ascribes to  "voice"13/ as a recuperative mechanism
for declining monopoly performance.
The challenge of organization design is to  set up for each function (as well as for
the entity as a whole) structures,  processes and management  styles which, in terms of organizational
goals, deliver the right mix of autonomy, participation and control within the organization as  well
as outside it (e.g., in relation to  clients and  suppliers).  Control helps to guarantee reliability of
processes and, through risk management,  institutional  survival.14
It  is  in  the  integrated design  of  structures (which  define  autonorny); processes
(which  facilitate  participation and  specify  controls)  and  organization  culture  (which  ensure
congruence and harrnony) that the art cf organizational  design lies.  Key elements of organizational
design are displayed in Box 5 and a development  illustration  is provided in Box 6.
There are, of course, close linkages between the internal and the external dimensions
of participation.  In a competitive environment,  the organization is under pressure to sell at market
driven prices and to keep cosLs  low so as to generate a profit for the stockholders.  It  must also
keep its most productive employees motivated lest they be hired away by aggressive competitors.
Thus, the market induces management not only to  seek efficient choices in  production processes
and technologies  but also in organizational  structures and participation  process options.15
Box 5:  ELEMIENTS  OF ORGA  TIZATION  DESIGN
Development is a  function of policy, institudtons  and programs.  Policy reflects  the values of the
society and the exigencies of the global economic  clirnate.  Isdtutions  are shaped by history, culture and tradition.
Programs (and projects) have technical,  economic, financial and organizational  dimensions which are
routinely subrnited  to review  and  appraisal by decision making bodies.  In  this context, organizational design
feamres need to receive the same kind of rigorous scrutiny as other aspects.  This is a multdisciplinary arL  The
matix  below provides analytical elenents to assess organizational  options.  Since an effective organization requires
compatibility  between the overall cultural  content and internal management  and orgaiizational variables, consisteny
in  the  timigular mix  of  instruments and  characteristics should nonnally be  soughL  For  example,  a  highly
cencralized  organization would not be  suitable for the management  of a creative organization  operating in a highly
competitive  environmenL
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Box 6:  ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR AGRICULTURE EXTENSION
The Training and  Visit (T  &  V)  system is an  important development innovation.  It
illustrates  the power of organization  design in pursuit of development  goals.
The object of agriculture extension is to disseminate  modern technology so as to improve
farming productivity. Prior to the introduction  of T & V in India, agriculture extension agents reported
to the community development ministry and handled a wide range of administrative functions.  Their
contacts with farmers were limited and they had little of value to communicate to them.  T & V shifted
the  line  of  command to  the  agriculture administration and  imposed management standards which
induced regular contacts between extensionists  and designated contact farmers and farmers' groups.  T
& V also required a weekly training session handled  by the agriculture  research administration  focussing
on selected agriculture  practices geared to the farming calendar.
This disciplined, predictable cycle of  interaction between farmers, extension agents and
research scientists has dramatically reduced the average cost of knowledge dissemination by  focussing
extension agent activities on  technological transfer instead of administrative chores.  While the prior
community development  system involved very heavy participation  with the rest of the rural bureaucracy,
effective controls were  lacking-and  productive participation between extensionists to  farmers was
limited.
Thus, T  & V provides an illustration  of the positive impact which a reduction in internal
participation coupled with increased outside participation  (and enhanced controls) can yield in certain
situations.  Unsurprisingly,  substantial changes in management  practices within the extension department,
promoting pride in (and loyalty to) the service, are needed to accompany the more rigorous control
environment,  e.g. enhanced living conditions,  transport  and other incentives.
In  the absence of  market discipline, similar pressures can be  simulated to  provide
the impetus for organizational change and to  reduce transaction costs.  These include the use of
customer "voice" combined with  a  hard budget constraint; pressures from the  political hierarchy;
highly selective recruitment and promotion standards; "results based" incentive systems; set  up of
competitive units  within  the  organization; privatization or  subcontracting; monitoring  against
performance benchmarks;  competitive bidding  for  service  provision;  appeals  to  professional
standards;  appeals to national pride, etc.
Whether  in  the  public or  the  private sector, change is  not  automatic.  Vested
interests and  organizational inertia  inhibit change.  Reform is  dependent on  the  framework of
incentives, the orientation of  economic policy and the norms of  behavior of  the society at large.
Conversely, policy and legal reform may not be sufficient to achieve results unless organizational
capacity is adjusted to deliver more efficient behavior. In brief, the cngineering of institutions is as
important as the adjustment  of policies.
6.  PARTICIPATORY  DEVELOPMENT:  DILEMMAS  AND  POLICIES
The  focus on  participatory development signifies an  opening up  of  development
economics to disciplines other than macroeconomics. The ongoing effort to  enhance policy design
and program implementation means, in particular, that microeconomics  and business administration
must join  forces under the umbrella of  institutional economics; that political economy should be17
rediscovered by development economists and that development  practice should be shaped by all the
social science disciplines.
Pragmatism and  emphasis on  experimentation is  a  major  thrust  of  participatory
development: capacity building for development  includes but goes beyond organizational  design.  It
involves multi-organizational systems, coalition building  and  the  associated  intricacies of  the
political economy.  Development is,  in  particular, peculiarly vulnerable to  the special collective
action problems posed by public goods.
Public Goods
Voluntary and  market  arrangements cannot  always  be  relied  upon  to  generate
adequate output and equitable allocations for public goods, i.e., goods which are accessible to, and
jointly consumed by,  large numbers of  individuals and/or firms.  Distribution of  resources for
production, as well as exercise of rules and regulations on output and delivery performance raise
issues of  fairness and organization  design which usually call for the establishment of adapted (and
often counter-intuitive)  participation  mechanisms.  In many cases, access to information,  channelling
of users' preferences and effective revenue generation call for complex institutional designs which
must  relay on  relative small organizational units within which voluntary compliance is  feasible.
This is because of the special problems associated with participation  in' large groups.  The paradox,
effectively articulated by  Mancur Olson 14/, lies in the fact that in large groups, individuals will
not  normally exert  themselves on  behalf  of  the  group precisely because the  gains  from  their
exertions will  accrue equally to  all  members of  the  group so  that  they  will only  receive an
infinitesimal share of the benefit from their efforts.  In the absence of countervailing arrangements,
the incentive for group action diminishes as the group expands.
A corollary of this paradox is that large organizations are less able to act in  their
own interest than small ones and that small groups tend to be more effective than large groups in
the sustainable production of  collective goods (e.g. ensuring maintenance of an  irrigation pump).
Another is that selective incentives to participation are essential for a  sustained effort to overcome
the free rider problem (e.g. the linkage of  irrigation officials' remuneration to  the level of  water
charges collected).  Still another is  that penalties are often crucial to  achieve sustainable results,
especially in large groups (e.g. interest surcharges for delinquent borrowers in a credit cooperative).
The difficulties associated with maintaining  a cohesive group effort despite the "free
rider" problem underlie the need for focussing participation resources where they have the highest
payoff.  Hence, the utility of  resorting to  markets where feasible.  Indeed, effective priority
setting in development program design starts with the selection of interventions  which can be safely
left to the market.  But the solution to the "free rider" problem also calls for management norms
and enforcement mechanism which transcend the dilemma, thus bringing back (at the macro level)
the  themes  of  solidarity and  control  as  mediating elements of  effective  participation earlier
encountered  at the firn  level.
While the costs of  imposing control can be  minimized through participation, the
effectiveness  of participation  hinges on such factors as reciprocity and trust which are themselves a
function of the competence and integrity of the leadership, social bonding, tradition, and other non
economic motivations-the  crucial loyalty factor which is the most elusive aspect of  institutional
development.
In  many  development  ventures,  consumption and  production  are  not  easily
distinguished.  For  example, students and  their  families are in  large  part  co-producers of  the
uldmate output of  schools and universities.  Users of a rural road or a  public fountain, depending18
on  their behavior, can extend the productive life of a common facility by  several years.  This is
why partial "beneficiaries" of projects are ultimately owners of the public goods created and must
be  systematically  involved through appropriate organizadonal arrangements in  the operatdon  of the
common facilides.
Country  Factors
Country conditions shape participation.  Culture, ideology, religion and the law are
major determinants  of social and economic behavior.  In particular, enforcement of property rights
and trade reform can be  fundamental to  the reduction of  transaction costs.  Conversely, social
restrictions (e.g.  caste)  can  inhibit  cooperation and  restrict  factor  mobility.  And  obviously,
instability in the political system contributes to transactdon  risks and costs.
The reduction of transaction  costs through institutional development is at the core of
sustained economic growth.  The creation of specialized organizations, the dissemination of  new
institutional norms, and  the gradual adoption of  behavioral standards which favor  reliability and
trust in social transactions are basic ingredients  of growing factor productivity.
The more developed the economy, the more impersonal the  exchanges, the more
complex the institutional framework and the larger the volume of transactions.  In modem societies,
contracts are common and transaction costs low.  Not only do  enforcement mechanisms exist but
they are trusted as competent and reliable.  In such a framework,  participation is best focussed on
the areas where they have the highest payoff (public goods).  Elsewhere, participation is needed
mostly as  a  social deterrent, an  institutional reserve or  a  form of  insurance against declines in
system performance.
Participation models grounded in developed country environments are not, however,
readily replicable to societies where institutions are weak and transaction costs are high.  In such
situadons, authoritarian solutions are tempting.  But  experience suggests that  whatever authority
exists must be complemented  by participation  in order to achieve effective outcomes.  For example,
where large numbers of  people are involved and scarce resources must be  rationed, the costs of
coercive control are prohibitive since group members will seek unrestrained access through bribing
and evasion in  such large numbers that enforcement will not be  feasible and deterrence will lack
credibility.
Box 7 illustrates how the key to this prisoners' dilemma lies in participation, i.e. in
judicious leadership and  the  use  of  information and  incentives to  persuade participants that the
worst outcome for all lies in  anarchic behavior.  Such an effort is  best carried out close to  the
ground to  evince confidence in  the rationality and  competence of the officials in  charge and to
enhance peer group pressure towards cooperative behavior.  Only then can aberrant behavior be
restricted to  the point that social deterrents become operative by  focussing control resources on a
manageable  segment of the total group.
The Development  Agenda and Participation
Fundamentally, development is  the  search  for  increased  individual  autonomy,
equitable opportunity and  sound environmental management.  Given the risks of  bureaucratization
and the limitations of the market, a continuous,  open and free debate regarding the goals and values
of the society can help ensure that policy aesign and implementation remain focussed on suitable
goals and modalities.19
Box 7:  THE DILEMMA OF WATER MANAGEMENT
In  the typical command area of a  South Asia irrigation project, farmers and  irrigation
officials are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma convincingly  analyzed by Robert Wade.15/
Typically, system design is  such that  water supply is  scarce and  deliveries uncertain.
Given the profitability  of  high yielding varieties dependent on  timely water applications, most farmers
want to take more water than they are entitled to.  From the  perspective of an individual farmer, the
preferred option is to have unrestrained access to water while others abide by the rules.  The second
best  is for the  individual farmer as well as others to comply with the rules.  The third best is  for
everyone to grab what he can.
Given  this  order  of  preference, the  equilibrium arising out  of  autonomous, "rational"
decision making is for the third option to materialize. This is, of course, the worst possible solution as
it involves bribing, water stealing, destruction  of structures,  even violence.  There is no simple way out
of the dilemma  which ultimately  arises out of farmers'  distrust  both of the reliability  of the irrigation
system  and of the integrity  of irrigation  officials.
Progress  towards  the second  option  is, however,  possible  by improving  the design of the
physical  and the institutional  system. For example,  reduction  of system  losses and improved  control
structures  can increase  supplies  and suitable  water deliveries  guaranteed  up to a "breakpoint  reservoir"
serving  a farmers'  group served  by a water  users'  association.
By enhancing  effective  control  by reducing  its scope and promoting  voluntary  involvement
in  water deliveries,  reliability  is  enhanced.  Of course, restoration  of  trust is  likely to  require
complementary  improvements  in internal management,  including  monitoring  of system performance,
independent  inspections,  incentives  for good performance,  etc.  Successful  models embodying  these
features  exist in East Asia where, in addition,  water management  finances  are often linked to water
revenues.
At  the  macro  level,  participation processes  differ  depending  on  the  mix  of
development priorities.  Different organizations are involved depending on  the policy objective.
Hence, distinct participation strategies must be  designed to  secure ownership of  adjustment and
environmental programs.  This means eliciting the cooperation of influential groups and individuals
so that reform can be made to stick until the overall momentum of change proves irreversible.
If growth is the predominant  priority, autonomy has pride of place and participatory
processes are both in high demand and, (once the enabling environment  is adjusted through reform),
can readily be  supplied through market mechanisms.  Where public goods are concerned, difficult
tradeoffs usually exist between the equity of  institutional arrangements and the ease of  resource
mobilization.
In today's  global -. conomy and interdependent  ecology, participation is taking place
in  a  supranational context.  In the process, new notions of  human solidarity are taking root  and
new global organizations are emerging.16/  But these too  must be  mediated at the local level in
order to  shape realistic incentives and control mechanisms and bring about outcomes which are
sound, efficient, equitable-and  sustainable.  The need for  social cohesion in  the face  of  rapid
global change makes domestic ownership of development programs crucial to  sustainability.  To
nurture such commitment, participation through coalition building and  agenda setting provides a
practical altemative for the heavy, coercive and, in the end, ineffective controls which would have
to be attempted without it.20
The sharp reduction in  communication  costs resulting from technological progress
has  already shifted the participation supply curve in  a  highly favorable direction for  the global
economy.  This  opens  up  opportunities for  developing countries willing and  able  to  accelerate
reform and institutional development.  Through economic reform, markets exert powerful pressures
towards organizational efficiency 17/  and  act  as effective coordination mechanisms for  a  larger
volume of  transactions.  Given  institutional development, the  costs  of  transacting are  reduced
through more efficient management and greater certainty in participation  outcomes.
From Micro to Macro  Participation
Much has been said about the diseconomies of scale associated with participation.
It is the basic rationale for the often misunderstood "small is beautiful" principle.  To do  things
right often means to do them on a small scale.  But the development  enterprise is too vast-and  the
human needs too urgent-not  to attempt effective replication and dissemination.
The  spread of  constructive change from  pilot to  project  to  programs-so  as  to
embrace the  society  at  large-will  not  take  place  without the  design  of  realistic  wholesaling
programs combined with  policy  and  institutional reform at  the macro  level.  Only  then  will
individual development operations find  their  ultimate justification within  a  secto,  and  country
context.  At  the global level, strategic alliances arnong development agencies (global and local;
governmental and  NGOs) will have to  be  strengthened to  facilitate dissemination and  to  achieve
results on  a  relevant scale.  Visible results  in  terms of  improved living  standards, expanded
economic opportunity for the world's poor and a  protected environmnent  will be  the  acid test of
global participation.
Thus,  while  projecte can  help  trigger  reform and  pioneer  institutional change,
participation  is a country development  imperative as well as a global challenge.
Conclusions
Some  development policy  recommendations flow  from  the  above  review  of
participatory development.
First,  participation should be  viewed as  a  vital  complement to  macroeconomic
adjustment.  Since  policy  is  itself  a  public  good,  participation is  needed  in  order  to  secure
participation.
Second,  institutional development is  enhanced by  policy  reform and  should  be
pursued in its own right as part of the country development  strategy.  The development of adequate
legal frameworks,  civil service reform and public information  should nornally  have priority as these
elements help reduce overall societal transaction  costs and risks.
Third,  the  institutional aspects of  development projects and  programs  should be
given appropriate weight and, in  this context, priority should be given to the  fulll use of  market
mechanisms so  as  to  concentrate scarce participation skills  and  resources where they  have the
greatest impact-public  goods creation and maintenance.
Fourth,  special emphasis should be  placed on  well managed, efficient knowledge
production and  dissemination as  well as  on  telecommunications  and  transportation infrastructure
since these investments also work to facilitate efficient social and economic interaction.21
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